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The extended mind theory of cognitive
distortions in sex offenders
Tony Ward*
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract An innovative theory of the nature of cognition, the extended mind theory (EMT), has
emerged recently in the cognitive science literature. According to the EMT, the boundaries of the mind
extend beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, into the world beyond. My aim in this paper is to
consider the practical implications of the EMT for therapists working with sex offenders’ cognitive
distortions. First, I provide an overview of the key assumptions of EMT. Secondly, I draw out the
major implications of this novel theory of cognition for the assessment and treatment of cognitive
distortions in sex offenders. Thirdly, to make the analysis more concrete, I discuss briefly how the
treatment module of cognitive restructuring could proceed according to the EMT.
Keywords Extended mind; cognitive distortions; sex offenders
Introduction
The relationship between theory and therapeutic practice is complex, and its value depends in
part upon the explanatory depth and scope of the theories in question. Appeals to the
importance of theory in forensic psychology can be problematic, as clinicians tend to be
pragmatic by nature and concerned primarily with effecting changes in sex offenders’ relevant
psychological vulnerabilities (Ward, Polaschek & Beech, 2006). However, there is no
necessary tension between arguing for the clinical utility of theories while also appreciating
the need to focus scarce resources on the process of reducing risk in offenders. In my view, a
useful way to conceptualize the role of theories in both research and practice is by viewing
them as knowledge-based tools, instruments for guiding clinical action and as indispensable
guides for programme providers. Forensically orientated theories depict mechanisms thought
to generate sexual crimes and articulate potential assessment and treatment targets. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine how case formulation and subsequent interventions can proceed reasonably
without recourse to theories that seek to explain clinical phenomena (Ward, Polaschek &
Beech, 2006). An analysis of existing treatment programmes for sex offenders and their
constituent techniques is likely to reveal their reliance on causal assumptions about the
offender, social and cultural contexts and victims. It is the job of a theory to hypothesize about
the nature of the causes of sexual offences and account for their interaction and culmination
in a crime. Theories can be relatively wide-ranging and target the whole of sexual offending or
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focus particularly upon specific causal factors such as empathy, deviant sexual arousal or
callous behaviour (Ward & Hudson, 1998).
A notable feature of sexual offenders is the way in which they frequently justify or
minimize their sexually abusive behaviour (Gannon, this issue; Gannon & Polashek, 2006;
Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999). It is common for therapists to encounter justifications
such as ‘‘the child seduced me’’, ‘‘I was out of control’’ or ‘‘what I did was not at all harmful’’.
Statements that are used by sex offenders to explain away, justify or minimize their actions
have been called cognitive distortions, a term introduced to the field by Gene Abel and his
colleagues more than 20 years ago (Abel, Becker & Cunningham-Rathner, 1984; Abel, Gore,
Holland, Camp, Becker & Rathner, 1989). In essence, cognitive distortions can be defined
loosely as offence-supportive statements (Gannon, this issue). Theories of cognitive
distortions can be divided into those that (a) focus primarily on post-offence (or following
an individual’s realization that his sexual preferences are deviant) cognitive processes and
impression management (e.g. Abel et al., 1984); or (b) are built around cognitive structures
that are hypothesized to precede and maintain offending (e.g. Ward, 2000).
While these theories make different claims about the structure and function of cognitive
distortions they arguably share a common set of metatheoretical assumptions about the nature
of cognition (Ward & Casey, in press). In brief, metatheoretical assumptions are abstract
claims about the general nature of cognition (i.e. perception, memory, thinking, judging,
concept formation, etc.) in human beings and its constituents and overall functions. In a
recent theoretical paper on the extended mind theory and cognition in sexual offenders we
identified these assumptions and argued that they reflect a common acceptance of internalism
about cognition (Ward & Casey, in press). By ‘‘internalism’’, I mean that existing theories in
the sexual offending field make the following claims. First, theories focus upon psychological
structures and processes within offenders and have nothing significant to say about the role of
the external environment other than viewing it as a trigger for cognitive processes, or as a
source of learning. Secondly, theories emphasize the informational richness and complexity
of cognitive distortions as internal representations. Distortions are assumed to contain
information about offenders’ own victims, and children in general, as illustrated by claims
such as ‘‘children benefit from sex’’ or ‘‘she seduced me’’. Thirdly, current theories appear to
accept the cognitive sandwich view of cognition, where cognitive processes are wedged between
sensory input and motor output (Hurley, 1998). The basic idea behind the sandwich model is
that the mind translates sensory input into internal representations that are then transformed
by various computational processes into instructions for motor behaviour.
An alternative, rather radical theory of the nature of cognition and the mind has emerged
recently in the cognitive science literature (Clark, 2003, 2007, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Gibbs,
2006; Johnson, 2007; Menary, 2007; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Wilson, 2004). According to
this viewpoint, the boundaries of the mind extend beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, into
the world beyond. It is argued that cognitive systems may loop into the world and hence
constitute hybrid systems consisting of a combination of artefacts, sensory motor patterns and
neural mechanisms. In this paper I will use the term the Extended Mind Theory (EMT) to refer
to a cluster of theses claiming that mental processes can contain external elements.
I do not have the space to defend and present the EMT in detail or to review critically
current theories of cognitive distortions in the sexual offending area. Theresa Gannon makes
an excellent job of reviewing research and theory on cognitive distortions in this issue, while
Allanah Casey and I have outlined systematically the EMT in a recent paper (Ward & Casey,
in press). Rather, my aim in this paper is to consider the practical implications of the EMT for
therapists. First, I provide an overview of the key assumptions of EMT. Secondly, I draw out
the major implications of this novel theory of cognition for the assessment and treatment of
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cognitive distortions in sex offenders. Thirdly, to make the analysis more concrete, I discuss
how the treatment module of cognitive restructuring could proceed according to the EMT.
The extended mind theory of cognition
The literature on the EMT covers a wide range of disciplines from philosophy of mind to
cognitive neuroscience, and as a consequence of this breadth it is often difficult to discern
what the core tenants of this perspective actually are (e.g. Clark, 2003, 2007, 2008; Gallagher,
2005; Gibbs, 2006; Johnson, 2007; Menary, 2007; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Wilson, 2004).
Despite the diversity of approaches, I suggest that the EMT is based upon three primary
theoretical claims: (a) human cognitive agents are physically embodied; (b) human agents are
characterized by plasticity of cognitive functioning; and (c) human agents have cognitive
systems that incorporate both internal and external components. The EMT refutes the
internalist view that the mind resides entirely within the brain and contends instead that
cognitive systems extend frequently into the external environment and integrate social,
cultural and technological resources when engaged in cognitive tasks such as problem-solving
or inferring (Menary, 2007). For example, solving a scientific problem typically requires
neural processes, sensory and motor organs, experimental apparatus and computer software.
All the elements play a crucial role in problem-solving. I will now discuss each of the above
features of the EMT in turn.
Embodiment
The claim that human beings are embodied radically is based upon a unified conception of the
mind and body and a rejection of dualism. That is, mental properties are thought to be
causally dependent upon the body and their form determined in part by the experience of
physical embodiment (Johnson, 2007; Ward & Nee, 2009). A useful analogy is that between a
sculpture and the materials from which it is constructed. While all the artistic qualities of a
sculpture are dependent upon the material from which it is fashioned, they are not reducible
to such proprieties. It makes sense to discuss the merits of a work of art quite separately from
consideration of its physical properties such as mass and weight. However, the sculpture could
not exist without being embodied materially and the form its artistic properties take reflects
the material from which it is made. For example, the grain of wood or texture of stone is
evident in its qualities as a sculpture. Similarly, in order to understand fully how human
beings are able to adapt as effectively as they do to their environment it is necessary to look
closely at the contribution of the body and its profound impact on psychological experience.
According to the EMT, the possession of sensory organs and the ability to move physically
and to orientate to different points in space are salient facts when analysing cognitive
functioning. The positioning of the eyes, nose and ears, and the tendency of the body to
orientate towards any source of stimulation, directly determines the way in which information
is processed by human beings (Gibbs, 2006). Furthermore, if the physical structure of our
sensory organs is also taken into account, it is obvious that the content of experience is
influenced substantially by our unique physical properties. Creatures with different bodies
and physiological systems are likely to perceive the world qualitatively differently from us.
Thus, the nature of perceptual experience and consequent reflection upon that experience is
rooted ultimately in the fact of embodiment.
What the above discussion points to is the causal dependence of psychological processes
on the fact of embodiment. However, arguably the relationship is stronger than that and
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researchers assert that cognitive processes and concepts take their form, and at times content,
from the experience of embodiment. An elegant example of the dependence of cognitive
categories on physical embodiment is illustrated by Mark Johnson, in his recent analysis of
psychological and philosophical concepts (Johnson, 2007). Johnson suggests that the
conceptual metaphor balancing perspectives derives its meaning from motor and sensory
concepts. He maintains that there is a mapping from the source metaphor, vision and motor
action to the target, the idea of judgement. Thus, in the resulting analogy, balancing different
viewpoints equates to the physical process of giving objects of equal weights the same value.
Johnson extends his analysis by proposing that the relationship between physically embodied
experience and abstract concepts holds for a significant number of theoretical ideas such as
causation (push), affection (warmth) and difficulties (physical burdens).
So far I have examined the way in which physical experience exerts a strong influence on
the content of thought and the form our judgements take. However, looking beyond purely
internal cognitive processing, the body also plays an important part in altering the
environment in ways that facilitate problem clarification and, ultimately, effective action.
Actions that are intended to change the knowledge structure of a physical environment are
called epistemic actions and enhance problem-solving capacity considerably. In their seminal
discussion of epistemic actions Kirsh and Maglio (1994) describe them as:
Actions designed to change the input to an agent’s information processing system. They
are ways an agent has of modifying the external environment to provide crucial bits of
information just when they are needed most. (p. 38)
An example of an epistemic action is when a bartender structures his or her environment to
help recall the type of drinks ordered by customers, a feat likely to tax normal working
memory, by using different kinds of glasses for each class of drink (Clark, 2008). Another
everyday example is when parents ask their children what they are feeling in order to decide
how best to respond to their needs. Kirsh and Maglio contrast epistemic actions with
pragmatic actions in which individuals move directly towards desired outcomes; for example,
ascertaining that a child is hungry (epistemic action) and then preparing them food. The key
feature of epistemic actions is that they involve extracting information from the physical or
social environment in order to make it easier to achieve cognitive goals such as following
instructions or interpreting behaviour. The relationship between epistemic actions and the
environment underlines the functional dependence between internal and external knowledge
resources.
Human cognitive plasticity
A second EMT metatheoretical assumption is that human beings are cognitively versatile
animals who are able to adapt quickly to novel situations and acquire new cognitive
repertoires and tools with relative ease (Clark, 2007). The capacity to extend sensory and
motor functions through the use of various technologies can also alter the sense of agency
possessed by human beings. Andy Clark argues that human plasticity and a corresponding
ability to create and enlist artefacts to increase functional capacity indicates that human
organisms are ecological controllers (Clark, 2007). That is, we are the kinds of animals that
actively co-opt internal and external resources to create hybrid problem-solving systems to
advance our personal projects and valued goals. In brief, Clark (2007) asserts that the human
brain operates according to the principle of impartiality:
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Our problem-solving performances take shape according to some cost function or
functions that, in the typical course of events, accord no special status or privilege to
specific types of operation (motoric, perceptional, introspective) or models of encoding
(in the head or in the world). (p. 197)
Clark argues that the principle of impartiality is supported by evidence from cognitive
neuroscience and technology that reveals people’s ability to utilize information from internal
and external resources to solve problems. For example, the phenomenon of change blindness
shows that under certain conditions individuals fail to notice major alterations in a visual
scene and rely instead on external information on a ‘‘need-to know-basis’’ when asked to
complete certain tasks. That is, they do not necessarily use rich internal representations of
visual scenes when evaluating outcomes and making decisions (Simons & Rensink, 2005).
The research on change blindness and other similar work challenges received cognitive
wisdom that human organisms typically use internal representational models to guide their
actions. By way of contrast, such research suggests that frequently human beings extricate
whatever information is required to resolve a problem from external sources (Brooks, 1991).
The concept of a task-specific device provides a useful way of demonstrating just how
cognitively flexible and pragmatic people can be when confronted with difficulties of various
kinds (Clark, 2008). A task-specific device (TSD) is a soft assembled device constituted of
internal and external components that is relatively easily put together and taken apart but that
functions smoothly to solve a problem (Wilson & Clark, 2009). A practical example of a TSD
is a saw, which can augment cutting functions when building a house. An example of a
cognitive TSD is the use of mathematical knowledge, textbooks, calculator and a software
programme when tackling a complex engineering problem. In the latter case, the TSD is
assembled from a combination of internal and external resources to address a specific
cognitive task and enhances the problem-solving ability of the person concerned considerably.
Clark (2008) asserts that cognitive TSDs ‘‘ . . .mesh the problem-solving contributions of the
human brain and central nervous system with those of the rest of the body and various
elements of local ‘cognitive scaffolding’’’ (p. 158). He claims that it is the innate (and evolved)
cognitive versatility and flexibility of human organisms that gives them the power to create
TSDs and to ultimately extend significantly their sensory, motor and cognitive reach.
It is important to stress that even though human beings recruit and integrate external
cognitive resources routinely into their cognitive systems, this does not mean that these
resources have exactly the same status as neural-based cognitive processes and structures. It is
only when technologies and cognitive products are integrated functionally with internal
psychological mechanisms that they are able to be properly construed as components of a
cognitive system. Thus cognition in human beings is organism-centred (the brain plays a special
role in recruiting resources to complete cognitive tasks) but not necessarily organism-bound
(the brain will recruit external resources as well, depending on costbenefits payoff, etc.). The
external systems can be grafted on, or linked with, internal neurally based cognitive systems
but once uncoupled they cease to be part of an extended system, whereas brain-based or
internal systems are always components of a cognitive system; that is, they cannot be
uncoupled in this way. Hopefully, this will allay fears or misconceptions of the EMT position
that there are bits of minds lying all over the external world: an unsettling and implausible
assertion. The critical feature of a hybrid extended cognitive system is that the various
components are integrated tightly and function smoothly to address a specific cognitive task.
Sometimes a TSD will be enduring, but often they are temporary and constructed to solve
only a specific problem.
Extended cognition model 251
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
24
 1
6 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
Cognitive extensions
The first two metatheoretical assumptions of the EMT portray the mind as physically
embodied and emphasize the dependence of cognitive functioning on sensory and motor
functions. It has also been established that human beings are organisms with significant
behavioural and cognitive plasticity who are able to boost their sensory, motor and cognitive
systems in order to increase their functional capabilities.
Once the scope of the mental has been widened to include unconscious processes and
long-term stored knowledge, the possibility of conceptualizing the mind as extended is opened
up. In view of the scientific evidence concerning the large number of cognitive systems that
operate below the threshold of consciousness, this is a legitimate assumption (Clark, 2007).
Furthermore, there is no feasible distinction between unconscious cognitive processes that
contribute to adaptive cognitive functioning and cognitive elements that are coupled tightly to
cognitive process but are external (Clark, 2008). If an external component such as pencil and
paper or a computer plays a similar role to that played by internal computational processes
and memory, it seems arbitrary and unjustified to deny it the same cognitive status as internal
processes. Therefore, it follows that these can be aspects of the mind and its cognitive systems
that are non-conscious but external.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that the principle of parity provides a useful heuristic for
deciding whether or not a particular set of external cognitive resources are part of an extended
cognitive system rather than tools that merely supplement a (internal) mind and its
operations. More specifically, Clark and Chalmers (1998) state:
Parity principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive
process. (p. 8)
An important question to consider is exactly what kinds of additional cognitive resources
ought to be considered for inclusion in an extended cognitive system? The short answer is that
there is no a priori limit to possible additions to a cognitive system; in theory any element that
is linked functionally in a mindbodyworld relationship could be included. Richard Menary’s
theory of cognitive practices provides a fruitful way to approach the question of the make-up
of an extended system (Menary, 2007). A cognitive practice is an inter-related series of
cognitive actions aimed at a goal that is governed by norms. Norms are essentially rules
specifying what counts as legitimate inferences and cognitive actions within a particular
practice; for example, norms governing permissible moves in chess or those that spell out
what constitutes an acceptable scientific explanation. A cognitive practice can include both
internal and external components; the essential thing to consider is whether or not the
components of a cognitive practice work together in an integrated way to solve a problem.
Artefacts of different types, visual diagrams, spoken and written language, computers, social/
cultural institutions and even other people can be elements of an individual’s cognitive system
(Gallagher & Crispy, 2009). Whether a component is or is not part of a cognitive system
depends entirely upon the functional role it plays within a practice, which addresses a
cognitive task.
A notable characteristic of human beings is the fact that they are epistemic engineers who
intentionally structure environments to facilitate problem-solving but who are also shaped by
these very same environments. The creation of learning cocoons is arguably one of the
features of human beings’ knowledge-generating activities that enable them to achieve such
control over themselves and the physical world (Sterelny, 2003). A considerable amount of
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the practical and theoretical knowledge required to engineer environments and to effectively
achieve cognitive tasks resides in cultural and social institutions. The existence of such
institutions directly enhances or ratchets-up individuals’ cognitive abilities and capacity to
continue to learn. In this respect, social networks and institutions can be regarded as potential
components of a person’s cognitive systems or extended mind.
Summary
I have briefly described EMT’s three major theoretical assumptions concerning cognition in
human beings. I have argued that human beings possess hybrid cognitive systems that extend
into the physical and social world. In other words, we are not limited cognitively by the
biological boundaries of skin and skull and are able to incorporate internal and external
elements intentionally when engaged in cognitive tasks. The components of our extended
cognitive systems can include neurally grounded processes such as logical analysis,
perception, interpretation, beliefs and attitudes. However, sometimes our beliefs can be
encoded in material vehicles such as notebooks, diagrams or other types of physical records
that exist outside the central nervous system. Furthermore, social and cultural institutions
and other people can also be regarded as external cognitive devices because of the role they
play in providing critical information or in conducting cognitive processes for us; processes
that are utilized in our problem-solving endeavours.
Extended mind theory and cognitive distortions in sex offenders
According to the EMT, an adequate understanding of the role of cognition in causing and
maintaining sexual offending is crucially dependent upon the fact that we are evolved animals
who are physically embodied, deeply socially embedded and have hybrid cognitive systems. To
recall, a hybrid cognitive system consists of an integrated combination of internal (brain-based
systems) and external components that enable agents to engage effectively in cognitive tasks
such as solving a problem or explaining a puzzling outcome. Accepting the EMT as a viable
theory of human cognition transforms the way in which cognitive distortions are conceptua-
lized and also offers novel suggestions for the treatment of offence-related problems. In a
nutshell, an EMT-guided perspective on cognitive distortions suggests that therapists ought to
change their theoretical lens when assessing and working with cognitive distortions and adopt
a more ecologically nuanced and multi-level approach. For example, if one accepts that
individuals utilize combinations of internal and external resources when involved in cognitive
tasks, then it means taking seriously the idea that, in some respects, therapists, group
members and social supports can be integral parts of offenders’ extended minds. This is a real
possibility, because offenders may rely heavily upon the viewpoints and cognitive resources of
group members and therapists when reflecting on their offending-related problems and lives.
Assessment
From an assessment standpoint, the fact that cognitive distortions are considered to reflect
problems in extended cognitive practices that have both internal components such as beliefs
and attitudes, as well as external informational and resources, has significant implications. For
one thing, distorted cognitive practices may be dynamic and context-dependent and therefore
persist only in unique circumstances. Therefore, one would not necessarily expect sex
offenders to demonstrate distorted thinking in every situation such as in the therapy room or
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in their living environments. Cognitive elements may be assembled into cognitive TSDs that
persist only for the duration of a unique task or may endure because offenders’ environments
and personal circumstances are relatively stable, and the TSD plays an important functional
role. An example of the former possibility is when an intoxicated individual is influenced
overly by his peers’ appraisals of a woman’s sexual interest in him and consequently he
disregards his rules about coercive sex in this unique context. An example of the latter is when
a member of a paedophile ring cognitive system contains sexualized beliefs about children and
external elements involving pornography and other individuals convinced of the sexual
acceptability of having sex with children.
A second, general implication of the EMT is that sometimes it may make more clinical
sense to locate cognitive distortions in an offender’s broader social and cultural environment
rather than inside his head. Because social and cultural institutions can be conceptualized as
external cognitive resources, they may be integrated into an offender’s cognitive system and
guide his distorted interpretations of the motives and behaviour of potential victims. What this
possibility requires is that clinicians approach the assessment of cognitive distortions within a
systemic framework and view external resources as part of an extended cognitive system. It
really means adopting a different conceptualization of what cognitive distortions are and
appreciating that human beings’ actions are embedded within a social network. The critical
difference between an EMT and a simple social scaffolding model is that the extended
cognitive system is seen as an integrated one and not simply a case where other people support
internal cognitive representations. In a real sense, the mind of the offender extends into the
world, and therefore his thinking processes, representations (beliefs, values) and so on have
both internal and external components.
A third implication centres upon the issue of the classification of sex offenders and its
relationship to cognitive distortions. From the standpoint of the EMT, one would expect
individuals who have a long history of sexual offending to have relatively stable cognitive
systems that incorporate information and resources associated with a deviant lifestyle.
Cognitive tasks involved in obtaining sexual partners such as planning, justifying and
interpreting will draw from norms and information provided by other people and materials
that encode deviant ways of thinking about sex; for example, websites, internet chatrooms or
other offenders. Individuals whose offences are more solitary in nature may organize their
offending environments in ways that facilitate decision-making and ultimately give them
access to children. Thus, providing children with video games, toys and exposure to other
‘‘willing’’ victims can lead them to view sexual contact with adults as acceptable or even
mandatory. The point is that the use of such external props can help offenders engineer
epistemically their environments in ways that help to create high-risk situations effectively. If
there is a functional integration between the information and cognitive processing capacities
of these external artefacts and offenders’ internal, cognitive processes, they can be regarded as
part of an extended cognitive system. There is no distinction between grooming, props,
cognitive resources and offenders’ cognitive systems in these scenario types.
A final general assessment implication follows from the assumption that human beings
are physically embodied beings. The fact of embodiment influences directly the nature and
quality of information processing in all people and therefore it follows that impaired physical
functioning will affect adversely a person’s ability to achieve his or her cognitive goals
effectively. For example, intoxication, extreme stress or physical illness can diminish
offenders’ ability to make appropriate judgements about their own or other people’s needs
and mental states. What this issue points to is the vulnerability of both internal and external
elements of a cognitive system or TSD to disrupted physical functioning. The physical
systems that are necessary for efficient cognitive functioning include sensory, neural and
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motor systems in both the offenders and any individuals relied upon for information or
problem-solving functions. Similarly, damage to technology or the material carriers of
representations used by offenders when engaged in cognitive tasks is also likely to result in
impaired performance and ultimately could trigger offending. Clinicians should therefore
ensure that when assessing offenders’ cognitive distortions they cast the net widely to include
the physical carriers of cognitive functions or representations.
Treatment
I would like to reassure therapists that the EMT simply provides a broader perspective within
which to work with sex offenders’ cognitive distortions, and does not require them to abandon
the strategies and techniques being used currently in treatment. In a sense, the EMT gives
therapists a wider lens that encourages them to conceptualize cognitive functioning in
offenders in systemic, dynamic and context-dependent ways. Having made this clear,
however, there are a few general treatment implications arising from the EMT.
A first implication is that it is important to encourage offenders to look at their cognitive
processes and subsequent actions from the standpoint of the EMT. Offenders are likely to
share the same internalist assumptions as therapists, mainly because it is arguably the default
view of cognition within western culture, one that is tied to an atomistic and mechanistic view
of the world (Clark, 2003). A key therapeutic task will be encouraging sex offenders to build
more adaptive extended cognitive systems that incorporate social and cultural resources that will
assist them to think more adaptively about themselves, other people and the world.
Emphasizing the flexible nature of human cognitive systems and the need to think about
themselves and their lives in contextual ways should be beneficial. Learning how to engineer
their environments in ways that make it easier to solve problems and to help achieve important
personal goals will also reduce the risk of thinking in offence-supportive ways. For example,
learning to use social supports and the perspectives of other people, or even technology such
as the internet, to provide information relevant to important decisions can result in more
adaptive outcomes. It is not enough from the EMT viewpoint to simply equip sex offenders
with a few cognitive tools and expect them to be able to make good judgements irrespective of
the environments in which they exist. Thus, if a sex offender wants to counter his deviant
thoughts about children but is in a hostile, rejecting environment where adults are not
available as effective cognitive ‘‘counters’’, I would have grave concerns about his chances of
being successful.
A related point is a need to concentrate resources on reintegration practices as well as
treatment programmes (Maruna, 2001). It is arguably what happens outside the therapy
room that is particularly critical. The EMT logically implies a treatment approach that is
seamless and works across the divisions of the therapy room and the wider social world. For
any specific cognitive task therapists ought to lift their eyes to the wider horizon and ask how
they can incorporate actively social supports, vocational opportunities and living environ-
ments that can support adaptive thinking and decision-making. Furthermore, there is a need
to broaden the therapeutic team to include other correctional staff and to focus activity
around the achievement of better lives plans, rather than simply risk reduction. The
orientating of treatment around plans is useful because it links cognition and cognitive
restructuring directly to practical reasoning skills and replaces the question ‘‘How can I think
differently?’’ to ‘‘How can I live differently?’’.
The reference to practical reasoning above underlines another relevant emphasis for
EMT sensitive treatment. In my earlier description of the EMT, I discussed the difference
between epistemic actions and pragmatic actions. Epistemic actions are important cognitive
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practices that have as their aim clarification of a problem, and can range from asking people
questions to seeking out information via the use of internet search engines. However, in order
to be able to extract information concerning a problem, it is necessary to possess an extensive
suite of social, cognitive and emotional regulation skills. In order to secure access to another
person’s opinions, it is first necessary to engage him or her in conversation, and probably to
establish a reasonable amount of trust. Additionally, the task of marshalling thoughts requires
some degree of emotional equilibrium and therefore a range of emotional competencies. If a
person is overly anxious or angry, it will be difficult to process effectively and acquire
information about a problem. All this points to the necessary integration of practical reasoning
into treatment and a corresponding need for therapists to think in a holistic way when
targeting offenders’ various risk factors. One of the merits of strength-based approaches is that
because they are focused upon the design and implementation of better life-plans, they
automatically encourage therapists to think about how offenders’ various goals and needs can
be reconciled, and how treatment plans based on these needs and goals can be implemented
successfully.
Extended mind theory and cognitive restructuring
I will now briefly try to make the rather abstract discussion above a little more concrete by
contrasting an EMT-inspired approach to cognitive restructuring with sex offenders to a
standard treatment programme. In a typical sex offender treatment programme, cognitive
distortions are addressed relatively early on in order to increase the motivation of offenders to
commit themselves to the arduous process of behaviour change (Marshall, Marshall, Serran &
Fernandez, 2006). Usually offenders are introduced to the idea that cognitive distortions play
a functional role in maintaining offending and are then taught a variety of strategies for
identifying and countering them. In addition, therapists may ask offenders to describe their
index offence in detail and, with the support of a group, detect and gently challenge distorted
beliefs and thinking styles. The hope is that offenders will then learn how to do this for
themselves when they are released from prison or leave a community programme. A review of
the literature indicates that most of the emphasis in cognitive restructuring modules is on what
happens inside an offender’s head, and the aim is to equip him with an arsenal of techniques
so he is able to counter effectively his own distorted thoughts. In essence, the objective is to
teach offenders to think logically and clearly about their beliefs and thinking styles as they go
about their lives.
What can an EMT-orientated approach to cognitive distortions add to what is considered
to be an effective overall treatment strategy? I will not revisit the general assessment and
treatment points mentioned above and will simply assume their relevance in the following
discussion. First, therapists need to assess offence-associated goals and determine what
relationship they have with individuals’ wider aspirations and life-plans. The cognitive aspects
of such goals should be clarified and the internal and external components noted. For
example, an offender’s sexually abusive actions could be underpinned by a belief that men are
entitled to have sex with women whenever they wish. Analysis might reveal that external
cognitive resources utilized by an offender could include his workmates, a macho subculture
and consistent consumption of violent rape depicting pornography. In addition, masturbatory
fantasies that incorporate themes of sexual domination of women provide further support for
a set of deviant beliefs and thinking processes which yield a representation of female sexuality
as the property of males. Further assessment could disclose that the offender concerned
consistently adopts an adversarial attitude to relationships and has difficulty asserting himself
in socially constructive ways.
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Ideally, the therapist now has a solid grasp of the way the above offender’s cognitive
distortions are generated by a combination of internal and external cognitive resources. A
second step is to relay to the offender the EMT view of human nature. The therapist is careful
to state that human beings are versatile animals who rely upon a combination of individual
and collective assets when solving problems and advancing their own interests. Examples
could be given of the way in which technology and modern societies more generally utilize the
collective talents of many people. This is also an ethically useful move, as it imparts an
important message to the offender that all human beings have equal moral value and, because
of their vulnerabilities, need others to make their way in the world. The offender’s own life
experiences and difficulties associated with his offending could be used as examples of the
dangers in drawing from deviant external resources when attempting to deal effectively with
life’s challenges. At this point in therapy, the aim is to present an image of individuals as
interdependent cognitively and emotionally, and also as motivated to seek the most satisfying
or fulfilling lives possible, given their personal circumstances.
The third step in a revamped EMT-orientated approach to cognitive distortions is a little
more indirect than that evident in traditional programmes and rests upon the formulation of a
coherent, approach goal intervention plan (Ward & Maruna, 2007). By helping the offender
interpret his offending, in part, as an attempt to establish sense of personal power or
autonomy, albeit in self-defeating and socially unacceptable ways, it is easier to focus upon
goals that he is prepared to accept and work towards. Furthermore, such goals physically
reach beyond the programme itself into the world beyond, and temporally, towards a future
life. The intervention plan will focus upon aiding the offender to think practically about the
primary goods or goals he is invested in, how to approach them in ways that are meaningful
and legal and to ascertain whether his plan is based on sound empirical foundations. The
appeal to sound empirical foundations will involve setting up (hybrid) cognitive systems that
contain both internal components (skills for evaluating goals and means to achieve them etc.)
and external resources such as access to information, technology, social networks and other
people. The therapist will work with the offender to plan carefully his subsequent intervention
programme and to specify what internal and external resources will be required to increase the
chance that he will be successful in achieving his goals. The cognitive restructuring aspects of
his intervention plan and subsequent programme experiences will be based in part on
effectively creating extended cognitive systems that are integrated with his other therapy goals.
In other words, the primary construct driving his therapy will be that of practical reasoning
and all aspects of the programme will focus upon increasing the offender’s ability to set goals,
plan and secure outcomes consistent with his overall values.
Thus, there is no artificial separation of cognitive restructuring from the rest of
treatment; in practice, the cognitive work never ceases and is meshed with every aspect of a
treatment programme. The EMT influence is evident in the above example by virtue of its
ecological and dynamic focus, and an acceptance that if one wants to change the way a person
thinks about himself and others it is necessary to help him build cognitive systems that bridge
the gap between what is inside his head and his environment. There will be a degree of
epistemic engineering by virtue of actions that provide easy access to information, adaptive
beliefs and additional thinking or problem-solving resources, either in the form of other
people or in written and electronic formats. An offender will still be accountable, but in the
process of making sense of what he did and accepting responsibility for his actions it is
anticipated that there will be some awareness of how his beliefs, attitudes and thinking was
guided in part by external representations and processes. He will then begin to grasp that to
change his thinking he will need to also change aspects of his environment. Changing his
Extended cognition model 257
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
24
 1
6 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
environment, in turn, will ideally involve a coordinated intervention plan that seeks to
establish competencies and opportunities to live a more satisfying and ethically acceptable life.
Conclusions
In this paper I have outlined the EMT and argued that it provides a fruitful way in which to
conceptualize the role of cognition in the generation of sexual offending, and has exciting
implications for sexual offending treatment. The utility of viewing cognition through an EMT
lens rests upon accepting its three major assumptions about human nature and cognitive
functioning. My view is that the convergent scientific evidence supports a view of human
beings as creatures who are radically physically embodied, possess significant cognitive
plasticity and who have the ability to construct external cognitive networks. Furthermore,
I have proposed that these assumptions have important implications for the way we assess and
treat sex offenders. In a short paper such as this I have only been able to make some
preliminary comments and sketch out how EMT-orientated cognitive interventions would
appear. Hopefully, however, I have done enough to encourage researchers and clinicians to
revaluate how they conceptualize cognitive distortions and their treatment, and to think about
therapy in a more ecologically nuanced and dynamic way.
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